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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

MAX FLOYD STOCKTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

\

)

Case No.
8569

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the afternoon of February 4, 1956, at approximately
6:00 P. M., Max Stockton, Lee Goddard and Dean Carter
were identified as being in the city of Huntsville, Utah.
Late in the evening of the same day, at approximately 11:30
P. M. the three drove in a stolen car from Ogden to Huntsville, and parked in the vicinity of Jesperson's Mercantile.
In the early morning of February 5, 1956, at approximately
1:30 A. M., an attempt was made to break into said mercantile, but after breaking off the outside padlock, they
were unable to cut the lock off the door. Because of this
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fact, they were forced to abandon their original plan to
commit larcency therein. They had been observed in their
attempt and the police and the owner of the mercantile had
been informed. The owner and his, wife observed a car
in the vicinity of the mercantile traveling with its lights off,
and the wife took the license number, which was BY 782.
This number was radioed to the Weber County Sheriff's
office and the three were apprehended by Deputy Sheriff
A. R. Coveio coming down Ogden Canyon. At this time, Lee
Goddard made a statement to Deputy Coveio out of the
presence of Appellant Stockton that the three had agreed
that Goddard and Carter would take the blame because
of the serious trouble Stockton was already in.
The Deputy found in the car a suitcase containing
various burglary tools, a padlock and hasp broken off the
lock. These were later identified as being the tools used in
the commission of the crime and the padlock broken off
the door at Jesperson's Mercantile.
In the case at hand there appears to be no question as
to whether there \Vas an attempted burglary committed, for
Goddard testified as to his guilt and evidence produced by
the state and the defendant conclusively proves that Goddard and Carter attempted to burglarize Jesperson's Mercantile. The question this court must resolve is whether
Max Stockton was just an innocent bystander who went
along for the ride and had no knowledge of the attempt of
Goddard and Carter to commit a felonious act. The State
maintains that the evidence proves that the appellant Stockton did in the night time, aid and abet Goddard and Carter
in the willful, unlawful, felonious and burglarious act of
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attempting to break and enter Jesperson's Mercantile, located in Huntsville, Weber County, Utah, with the intent
to commit larceny therein. Only the appellant Stockton is
being tried and charged with this crime, but for the purpose
of this brief, the state will refer to Lee Goddard and Dean
Carter as co-defendants and co-conspirators.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE STATE PRODUCED ABUNDANT AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE, AT THE TRIAL
WHICH SUPPORTS THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BURGLARY
IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT· ERR IN ALLOWING DEP·UTY SHERIFF COVElO TO TESTIFY AS TO A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY SHERIFF AND ONE OF THE CO·DEFENDANTS.

POINT III
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW AND IT
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
REQUESTE.D INSTRUCTIONS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE PRODUCED ABUNDANT AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL
WHICH SUPPORTS THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BURGLARY
IN TI-IE SECOND DEGREE.
The appellant was charged with the violation of Sections 76-9-3 and 76-1-30, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which
together set forth the crime of attempt to commit burglary
in the second degree. The Supreme Court of Utah, in the
case of State v. Prince, 65 Utah 205, 284 P. 8 said:
"The three elements which constitute an attempt are: (1) The intent to commit the crime;
(2) the performance of some overt act towards the
commission of the crime; ( 3) the failure to consummate its commission."
The authorities generally agree that mere preparation is not
sufficient to constitute an attempt. There must be some
act executed towards the consummation of the crime, however, this act need not be the last proximate act to the completion of the offense attempted. The intent must be manifested and it is dependent upon the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. See 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law. Section 75, and cases cited therein.
Here, the appellant conspired 'vith the co-defendants
for the perpetration of this crime, so according to wellknown criminal and agency law, he 'vould be liable for the
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5
acts of the co-conspirators. The California case of People
v. Frankfort, 251 P. 2d 401 lays down the general rule and
is supported by an abundance of authority where it states:
"Members of a conspiracy are bound by all acts
of other members done in the furtherance of the
conspiracy."
The evidence produced by the state implicates the appellant
in every phase of this crime and makes him guilty of aiding
and abetting in the perpetration thereof.
The state produced a witness who testified, and whose
testimony was not contradicted, that he saw defendant
Stockton in the presence of two other people in the city of
Huntsville on the afternoon of February 4, 1956 (T. 29, 30).
Ev:idence was set forth by the state that the co-defendant
Goddard testified at the preliminary trial that defendant
Stockton helped and advised them as to what car they should
steal to use when they committed the crime (T. 80, 81).
The state also brought forth testimony that in the early
morning of February 5th a car was seen parked in the intersection next to the Jesperson Mercantile with the motor
running and the lights off, (T. 6, 7) and from such car a
person could keep a look-out in all four directions (T. 7).
A person was observed going from the car to the mercantile
and returning to the car (T. 7). Other testimony was that
at the preliminary trial co-defendant Goddard testified that
he went from the mercantile to the car to report that they
had the lock off the door (T. 81). The state's witness also
testified that at a later time he noticed the car gone from
the intersection, but then saw a car with its motor running
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and the lights off parked one-half block from the mercantile in the same location that defendant stated it was (To
9) . Other witnesses seeing the car in this location noticed
the brake light flash on such car and then traveled around
the block to observe the car, but it had moved (To 9) However, they followed a car traveling with its lights off and
took down the license number which was BY 782 (T. 19;
27). This number was then radioed ahead to the Weber
County Sheriff's office and the appellant Stockton, with
Goddard and Carter, was apprehended in Ogden Canyon
in the car bearing the said license number which was seen
in the vicinity of Jesperson's mercantile (T. 34, 35). The
Sheriff found a suitcase of burglary tools and a padlock
on the front seat of the car and a hasp lying on the floor
of the back seat (T. 35, 36) o These items were introduced
as Exhibits A, B, C, and D, and were uncontradicted as
being the lock taken off the door of Jesperson Mercantile
and the set of burglary tools used in the commission of the
crime (T. 42, 43, 61, 65, 66).
0

The appellant's evidence was that during the afternoon
of February 4th the co-defendants Goddard and Carter,
while preparing to drive to Huntsville for the purpose of
locating a road out of the valley, (T. 56) just happened to
see the appellant coming out of a pool hall (T. 51) o They
asked the appellant to go for a ride, yet they claim there was
no conversation concerning their purpose of locating another road out of the area (T. 56). That evening, at approximately 11 :30 P. M. after the co-defendants had stolen
a car, ( T. 52) just by coincidence they saw appellant standing on the street corner, and again they asked him to go
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for a ride and they proceeded to Huntsville, the same city
they had been to in the afternoon ( T. 53) . There, according
to their testimony, they parked the· car one-half block from
Jesperson's :Th1:ercantile, (T. 53) and when the appellant
asked "where are you going", they sa.id "we'll be back in
a little while" (T. 54). Co-defendants then left the car,
taking the suitcase with them and appellant waited for
them in the car (T. 67, 79). Approximately 15 minutes
later they returned to the car and after driving around
Huntsville, started down Ogden Canyon where they were
taken into custody ( T. 34, 54, 55) .
Even if appellant remained in the get-away car as a
look-out, according to the law of conspiracy he would still
be liable, the same as the co-defendants. This is supported
by the Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 76-1-44 which
read's in part as follows :
"All persons concerned in the commission of a
crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether they
directly commit the act constituting the offense· or
aid and abet in its commission or not being present,
* * * are principals in any crime so committed."
The appellant asks us to believe that during this series
of events he was no naive that he had no knowledge of the
eo-defendants' intent to commit burglary. The California
court, in the case of People v. Kross, 112 Cal. App. 2d 602,
247 P. 2d 44, where there was a conviction of theft on
circumstantial evidence, said :

"Whether the evidence is as compatible with
innocence as with guilt was a question for the jury
and not for this court ( C,itations) . An appellate

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

court will not review the evidence beyond the point
of scrutinizing the record to determine whether there
is substantial evidence that supports the inference
of guilt. The judgment will not be reversed unless
it can be said that it is not supported on any reasonable hypothesis (Citations). * * * Direct proof
of burglary and theft is not necessary; they may be
proved by circumstantial evidence. * * * It is
not the law, * * * that each fact in a chain of
circumstances that will establish a defendant's guilt
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Citations). The doctrine of reasonable doubt applies to
proof of guilt and not to the establishment of each
incident or event inculpating the defendant ( Citation). A reasonable doubt that would warrant acquittal is one that results or arises from a 'consideration of all the evidence' in the case" (Citations).
The state set forth evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant manifested the necessary intent and executed an overt act which led towards the consummation of the crime. The repeated coincidences indicate the
absurdity of the position of the appellant and the jury at
the trial court was able to see through it and returned a
verdict of guilty.
In the case of People v. Chapin, 303 P. 2d 365, the California court in regards to cases being revievved, stated:
"When his appeal is on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding of the
jury, the burden is on appellant to demonstrate that
there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
character to support the verdict upon any reasonable
hypothesis whatever. It is not enough that the established facts and circumstances may be reconciled
with the innocence of the accused. Before a reversal
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may be had, the facts must disclose no reasonable
basis for any infe·rence other than appellant's innocence." People v. Hatton, 114 Cal. App. 2d 195, 196,
249 P. 2d 901, 902.
The appellant has failed to meet this burden of proof,
therefore, since the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
conviction, it should be upheld.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DEPU'TY SHERIFF COVElO TO TESTIFY AS TO A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY SHERIFF AND ONE OF THE CODEFENDANTS.

The conversation in question is located on page 83 of
the transcript beginning with Line 19 and reads as follows:
Do you have any recollection with regard
-did you have a conversation with Lee Goddard
relative to his stating that they were willing to take
the blame.
"A. Yes sir.
"Q.

"Q.

Will you tell us what the conversation

was?
"A. I talked with Lee Goddard about this burglary in Huntsville.
"Mr. Handy: Just a moment may I voir dire the
witness your honor.
"The Court: Yes."
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Voir dire examination by Mr. Handy:
Was this conversation, Officer Covieo in
the presence· of Mr. Stockton.
"A. No sir
"Q.

"Mr. Handy: I object to it your honor as being
hearsay."
Argument
"The Court: I'll overrule the objection as an
exception to the rule. You may testify.
"(To witness) Now do you remember the last
question?
"A. Yes, I had a conversation with Lee Goddard pertaining to Max Stockton. Goddard told me
just before-well just after I had stopped the car
at the time he was getting out of the car he stated
the conversation between Lee Goddard and Dean
Carter and Max Stockton was, should Lee Goddard
take the blame along with Dean Carter and leave
Max Stockton out of it because of the seriousness
of it and Max Stockton said yes, that he did want
them to take the blame because of the seriousness
of the trouble he was already in."
The above statement of the record' wherein it states:
* * * "Goddard told me just before-well, just after he
had stopped the car at the time he was getting out of the
car, he stated the conversation between Lee Goddard and
Dean Carter and Max Stockton was", * * * would indicate that the conversation between Goddard and Deputy
Covieo took place in Ogden Canyon just after the Deputy
had stopped the car and before the conspirators were put
under arrest or the conspiracy brought to an end. The dis-
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cussion which Deputy Coveio is testifying to between Stockton, Goddard, and Carter took place at a time when the
three were alone in the car coming from the scene of the
crime while they were co-conspirators and before they were
taken into custody, for the recorded testimony of Officer
Coveio on pages 85 and 86, is as follows:
Did they have that discussion in the presence of Max? Is that what you are saying?
"A. The three were together in the car, ye'S
sir.
"Q.

"*

* *

And at that time Lee Goddard told you
that they had this discussion about taking the blame,
Max Stockton was not present was he?
"A. No sir.
"Q.

And any discussion had was prior to your
stopping the car ; is that right?
"A. Yes."
"Q.

In the case of State v. Simpson, 236 P. 2d 1077, 1079,
the Utah Supreme Court sets forth a general rule as to
conversations and declarations of a co-conspirator wherein
it state·s:
"It is true that ordinarily the conversations and
declarations of a co-defendant out of the presence of
the accused, after the commission o.f the crime would
not be competent * * * there can be as there
was here a conspiracy between persons to engage
jointly in other criminal offenses and if this fact is
shown by independent evidence the statement of any
of the conspirators made in furtherance of a common criminal purpose is unquestionably admissible
against all. Such conduct in furtherance· of the common design does not raise the same question as ordinary admissions or conversations."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
The Simpson case continues and quotes from the case
of People v. Suter, 43 C'al. App. 444, 111 P. 2d 2331, where
the court said:
"It has been held that the common design of a
criminal enterprise may extend in point of time beyond the actual commission of the act constituting
the crime for which the accused is being tried, such
as for the purpose of concealing the crime, securing
the proceeds thereof, sharing in or dividing the proceeds of the crime, or bribing or influencing witnesses, and that consequently, evidence is admissible
to prove acts committed after * * * the perpetration of the crime for which the accused is on trial.
Of course, it must reasonably appear that such acts
were committed in furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy."
The State v. Simpson case concludes by quoting from
State v. Irwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, where the Utah
court said:
"Acts done by the conspirators in order to escape the consequences thereof, even though they at
that time know that the conspiracy cannot continue,
are nevertheless acts done in the furtherance of the
conspiracy."
This of course indicates that even though the conspiracy is at an end and the conspirators are taken into custody,
any testimony of the conspirators, in order to escape the
consequences thereof would be admissible. This Court, in
the case of State v. lr'tvin, supra, wherein there was some
question as to the admissibility of testimony by officer
Record who was Chief of the Anti-Vice Squad, that Pierce
told him that Mayor Irwin had instructed him to make
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collections from racketeers for allowing them to operate
in the city. The court held:
"Thus the testimony by Record of his conversation with Pierce was admissible in evidence against
all of the defendants, not for the purpose of proving
agency, this was proved by other evidence, but as a
circumstance proving the conspiracy. This conversation was in furtherance of the conspiracy. * * *
This testimony was therefore clearly admissible."
In the Oklahoma case of Parnell v. State, 250 P. 2nd
47 4, the co-conspirator Lee was transporting intoxicating
liquors from without the state into the state of Oklahoma
without a permit from the tax commission. At the time of
his arrest he 1nade certain admissions to the arresting sheriff implicating the other conspirator, Parnell. It is contended that when the court allowed the sheriff to testify
to the statement made by Lee at the time of his arrest, it
committed reversible error because such testimony was
hearsay. The court reiterated the general rule that the
arrest of the co-conspirator precludes any further concerted
action and ordinarily puts an end to conspiracy. Therefore,
any statement by the co-conspirator out of the presence of
the other conspirator would be hearsay and inadmissible.
However, the court held that the facts and evidence show
that the conspiracy had not been abandoned with the arrest
of Lee; that the conspiracy was. still in effect and therefore the statement by Lee to the sheriff was admissible
against both the conspirators even though not made in the
presence of Parnell. The court said:
"And until this conspiracy was accomplished or
abandoned, the declarations of either Parnell or Lee

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

in connection with the conspiracy would be admissible against the other man, even though made in
the absence of the other conspirator."
The Parnell case, in quoting from Barnes v. State, 8
Okla. C. R. 554, 129 P. 657, states:
"The responsibility of co-conspirators for the
language or conduct of those acting with them is
not confined to the accomplishment of the common
purpose for which the conspiracy was entered into,
but extends to and includes all declarations made and
collateral acts done incident to and growing out of
the common design and spoken or done by a co-conspirator as against all of his co-conspirators."
From the above discussion of cases it appears that in
order to introduce testimony of a co-conspirator, you must
first show other evidence tending to prove a conspiracy
and, second, that the conspiracy was not ended at the time
the statement was made. Mr. Justice Wade, speaking for
this court in the case of State v. Irwin, supra, quoted the
following Utah statute found in the Utah Code Annotated
1953, Section 77-31-18:
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the
defendant with the con1mission of the offense; and
the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely
shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof."
The court continues and states:
"This court has held this corroboration need
not go to all the material facts testified to by the
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accomplice (State v. Stewart, 57 Utah 224, 193 P.
855) ; that the corroborative evidence need not be
sufficient in itself to support a conviction; it may
be slight and entitled to little consideration. People
v. Lee, 2 Utah 441; State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149,
49 p. 302. * * *
"On the other hand, the corroborating evidence
must implicate the defendant in the offense and be
consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence, and must do more than cast a grave suspicion on him, and all of this must be without the
aid of the testimony of the accomplice. * * *
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972; and State v.
Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d 51."

The above was upheld by Mr. Justice Crockett in the case of
State v. Simpson, supra.
The appellant in his brief on pages 12 and 13, states
the following :
"The Utah case of State v. Simpson, 236 Pac.
2nd 1077, 1078, in regard to a conversation of a codefendant out of the presence of the defendant had
this to say:
" 'There can be as there was here, a conspira~y between persons to engage jointly in
other criminal offenses and if this fact is shown
by independent evidence, the statements of any
of the conspirators, made in furtherance of the
common criminal purpose is unquestionably admissable against all.'
"According to the above Utah case there must
be independent evidence of other criminal offenses,
and only if the statements were made in furtherance
of the common criminal purpose are the statements
admissable." (Emphasis by Appellant.)
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Here, the appellant, by his own admission, admits that the
conversation would be admissable if it complied with the
requirements of producing independent evidence of the
criminal offense and if the statement was in furtherance of
the conspiracy. The state according to the evidence as set
forth in Point I of this brief, has certainly complied with
the requirements set down in State v. Irwin, supra, and
State v. Sitnpson, supra, in regards to proving evidence
tending to show a conspiracy or the corpus delicti. The
conspiracy was not at an end when the statement was
made, for the defendants had not yet been placed under
arrest and even if they had been, according to State v. Simpson, supra, an act to escape the consequences of a conspiracy is still part of the conspiracy. The purpose of the conversation between the three conspirators was to avoid the
consequences of the conspiracy for Stockton. Therefore,
this "vould meet the requirement that the conspiracy must
still be in force. The state has met this burden of proof and
thus the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of
Deputy Coveio.
POINT III
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW AND IT
DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
The state maintains that the Court's instructions numbered 1 to 22 covered the Ia \V as it applies to the facts of
this case. The appellant's requested instructions numbered
1 to 6 'vere adequately and thoroughly covered within the
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Court's instructions. The appellant, on pages 14 to 17 of
his brief, states his requested instructions, so for the purpose of this argument, they will be referred to by number
and will not be restated.
In the requested instructions 1, 5 and 6, the appellant
tends to invade the jury's domain of being sole judge of
determining the credibility of the witnesses, of the weight
of evidence, and of all questions of fact. The Supreme
Court of Utah, in the case of State v. Fertig, 233 P. 347,
349, states :

"* * * If the facts themselves are in dispute
as to whether the· witness would or did not do the
things which if he did do them, would make him an
accomplice, then it is for the jury to determine
whether he is in fact an accomplice or not. State
v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 205."
According to the case of State v. Bowman, 92 Utah
540, 70 P. 2d 458, an accomplice is as guilty as the principal, for it states:
"In this state we have no statutory definition
of an accomplice, but the court has construed the
word to refer to one who is or could be charged as
a principal with the defendant on trial."
Therefore, even if the jury found appellant Stockton was an
accomplice, in accordance with appellant's. requested instruction, he would still be guilty of the crime charged.
The court's instructions numbered 10, 12, 13, 16, 17
and 20 generally cover the law as requested by the appellant
in his above three requested instructions.
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Requested instructions numbered 2 and 3 are specifically covered by the court's instruction No. 11.
Appellant, in his requested instruction No. 4 infers
that there was a voluntary abandonment of the criminal
intent, therefore there was no crime of attempt to commit
burglary. The facts prove that no such issue was raised,
for the padlock was broken off and an attempt was made to
cut the lock off the door, as well as to pry the back door
open. The final act to the consummation of the crime was
put into execution, but due to their inability to complete
their purpose, they were forced to abandon it from necessity
rather than voluntarily.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant was convicted of the offense charged
in a fair and impartial trial by a jury who saw and heard
the witnesses and were able to determine the accuracy and
credibility of the evidence that was produced. The evidence,
even without the testimony of Deputy Coveio was sufficient
to ,convince a reasonable man beyond a reasonable doubt of
the guilt of this. man. Deputy Coveio's testimony as to the
furtherance of the cons.piracy by attempting to avoid the
consequences of their act substantiated and corroborated
the evidence and the guilt of Max Stockton. The court properly instructed the jury as to the law that applies. to this
case, therefore, the judgment of the· lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. C:ALLISTER,
Attorney General,
HOMER F. WILKINSON,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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